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A b s t r a c t	
The	research	of	natural	statics	and	damages	connected	with	them	is	difficult	in	consideration	of	their	random	
occurrence.	Making	a	decision	about	necessaries	and	effectivities	of	resources	usage	of	the	lightning	surge	
protection	and	about	the	choice	of	a	suitable	protection	method,	should	be	preceded	by	an	estimation	of	the	
risk	due	to	damages	lightning	discharges.	In	the	report,	the	risk	analysis	of	damages	of	the	railway	traction	
and	of	the	control	command	and	signaling	equipments	due	to	lightning	discharges	for	a	real	case	of	damage,	
is	represented.	In	the	risk	analysis,	a	fragment	of	a	rail	track	in	which	lightning	discharges	appeared,	was	
taken	into	account.	The	results	of	these	occurrences	estimation,	calculated	by	the	LIOV	software,	taking	
into	account	real	parameters	of	the	system,	have	been	also	represented.	
Keywords: lightning protection, damages, risk management, railway traction, control command and 
signaling equipments 
S t r e s z c z e n i e	
Badanie	naturalnych	wyładowań	atmosferycznych	i	szkód	z	nimi	związanych	jest	utrudnione	ze	względu	
na	ich	losowe	występowanie.	Podjęcie	decyzji	o	konieczności	i	efektywności	stosowania	środków	ochrony	
odgromowej	 i	 przepięciowej	 oraz	 o	wyborze	 odpowiedniej	metody	ochrony	po	winno	być	poprzedzone	
oszacowaniem	ryzyka	szkód	spowodowanych	wyładowaniami	atmosferycz	nymi.	W	artykule	przedstawio-
no	analizę	ryzyka	uszkodzeń	sieci	trakcyjnych	i	urządzeń	sterowa	nia	ruchem	kolejowym	spowodowanych	
wyładowaniami	atmosferycznymi	dla	jednego	przypadku	uszkodzenia.	W	analizie	ryzyka	uwzględniono	
fragment	szlaku	torowego,	na	którym	wystąpiły	wyła	dowania	atmosferyczne.	Przedstawiono	również	wy-
niki	oceny	tych	zjawisk	przy	pomocy	programu	LIOV,	uwzględniając	parametry	rzeczywiste	układu.	
Słowa kluczowe: ochrona odgromowa, uszkodzenia, zarządzanie ryzykiem, sieci trakcyjne, urządze nia 
sterowania ruchem kolejowym 
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1. Introduction
Trolley	 wires	 and	 railway	 traffic	 controlling	 devices	 (rtc)	 enclose	 in	 their	 own	 range	
considerable	areas	of	the	country	and	are	subject	to	the	influence	of	lightning	flashes	in	a	large	
rate.	The	 fulminic	 threat	 can	be	 a	 result	 of	 a	 stroke	 immediate	hit	 into	 the	 trolley	wires	or	
the	non–traction	line	(NTL)	or	a	result	of	induced	voltages	by	nearby	discharges	to	earth.	As	
a	result	of	surges	influences,	damages	of	electric	and	electronic	devices	or	of	their	components	
can	appear	causing	losses	eg.	in	the	form	of	delays	of	trains	and	their	results.	The	choice	and	
the	 installation	 of	 suitable	 protection	 resources	 for	 rtc	 devices	 and	 of	 the	 electric	 traction	
against	the	results	of	lightning	discharges	to	earth	influence	gives	marked	advantages	which	
can	be	evaluated	basing	on	the	methodics	of	management	the	lightning	damages risk,	in	detail	
described	 in	 the	 standard	EN	 62305–2:	 2012	 –	 Protection	 against	 lightning	 –	 Part	 2:	Risk	
management	[1].	In	accordance	with	this	norm,	the	decision	of	necessaries	and	effectivities	of	
the	usage	of	lightning	and	surges	protection	and	of	the	choice	of	a	suitable	protection	method,	
should	result	from	the	estimation	of	damages	risk	due	to	atmospheric	discharges.	
2. The management of lightning damages risk
The	 qualification	 of	 the	 risk	 of	 damages	 caused	 by	 strokes	 according	 to	 the	 standard	
EN	62305–2:	2012	–	Protection	against	lightning	–	Part	2:	Risk	management	[1]	demands	
taking	 into	account	many	factors	and	parameters.	To	estimate	 the	risk	of	damages	for	 the	
given	object,	it	is	required	taking	into	account	tens	of	different	data	describing	among	others	
constructional	features	of	the	object,	its	location,	the	geometry	and	measurements	and	also	
the	level	of	surges	resistance	of	the	electric	and	electronic	equipment.	It	is	also	required	the	
qualification	of	the	accepted	value	of	the	risk	by	the	protection	resources	designer	or	the	user	
of	the	object,	which	after	exeeding	it,	the	qualification	of	the	material	consequential	losses	
range	resulted	from	the	immediate	hit	of	the	stroke	into	the	structure	and	of	the	losses	related	
to	the	influence	of	the	nearby	discharges	to	earth,	will	be	indispensable.	
In	the	analysis,	it	was	accepted	that	trolley	wires,	non–traction	lines	and	the	connected	
to	 them	devices	 rtc	 are	 service	–	devices.	One	of	 the	decisive	of	 the	 threat	 factors	 is	 the	
average	of	one	year’s	number	of	strokes	hitting	into	trolley	wires,	non–traction	lines	(NTL)	
and	connected	to	them	rtc	devices	or	nearby	them.	Knowing	these	parameters	we	can	qualify	
the	probability	that	the	discharge	will	hit	 into	mentioned	devices.The	losses	resulted	from	
this	are	in	consequence	of	damages	[2,	3].	A	result	of	damages	are	also	delays	of	trains	and	
due	 them	 additional	 losses.	Values	 of	 these	 factors	 depend	 considerably	 on	 the	 correctly	
definite	equivalent	of	the	assembling	area.	
3. The method used to estimate the risk of lightning damages occurrence
To	estimate	 the	 risk,	 it	 is	assumed	 that	 the	current	of	 the	stroke	 is	 the	main	source	of	
the	 damage	 and	 can	 cause	 damage	 depending	 on	 the	 characterization	 of	 the	 subjected	 to	
protection	structure.	To	most	important	concerning	characterizations	belong:	the	kind	of	the	
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construction,	contents	and	uses,	the	kind	of	the	service	device	–	and	of	provided	protection	
resources.
In	 association	with	 the	 occurrence	 of	 different	 cases	 of	 hits	 and	 lightning	 influences,	
different	risk	components	elements	are	qualified,	taking	into	account	reasons	of	damages	as	
well	as	types	and	kinds	of	losses.	On	regard	of	the	place	of	the	stroke,	the	following	sources	
were	specified	:
S1		–		flashes	to	a	structure,
S2		–		flashes	near	a	structure,
S3		–		flashes	to	a	line,
S4		–		flashes	near	a	line.
Considering	the	practical	use	of	the	risk	estimations,	three	basic	types	of	damages	which	
can	appear	as	a	result	of	lightning	strokes	were	favoured	(Table	1)	:
D1		–		injury	to	living	beings	by	electric	shock,
D2		–		physical	damage,
D3		–		failure	of	electrical	and	electronic	systems.
T a b l e 	 1
The classification taking into account the source of damages, types of damages and losses 
depending on the point of stroke [1]
Lightning	flash Structure
Point	of	strike Source	of	damage Type	of	damage Type	of	loss
S1
D1
D2
D3
L1,	L4a
L1,	L2,	L3,	L4
L1b,	L2,	L4
S2 D3 L1*,	L2,	L4
S3
D1
D2
D3
L1,	L4a
L1,	L2,	L3,	L4
L1b,	L2,	L4
S4 D3 L1b,	L2,	L4
a)	Only	for	properties	where	animals	may	be	lost
b)	Only	for	structures	with	risk	of	explosion	and	for	hospitals	or	other	structures	where	failures	of	
internal	systems	immediately	endanger	human	life
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The	damage	 of	 a	 building	 object	 in	 consequence	 of	 a	 lightning	 stroke	 can	 be	 limited	
to	a	part	of	the	structure	or	can	include	the	whole	object,	or	surrounding	structures	or	the	
environment	(eg.	chemical	or	radioactive	issues).	Every	type	of	the	damage,	alone	or	together	
with	other	damages,	can	produce	different	consequential	 losses	 in	 subjected	 to	protection	
structure.	The	type	of	the	loss,	that	can	appear,	depends	on	proprieties	of	the	structure	itself	
and	its	contents.	In	the	case	of	the	analysed	service	–	devices	the	following	types	of	losses	
were	taken	into	account	[1,	4]:
L1		–		 loss	of	human	life	(including	permanent	injury),
L2		–		 loss	of	service	to	the	public,
L4		–	 	loss	of	economic	value	(structure,	content,	and	loss	of	activity).
In	accordance	with	 the	standard	EN	62305–2:2012	[1],	 in	 the	 risk	assessment	of	R	as	
probables	 of	 one	 year’s	 average	 losses	 for	 every	 type	 of	 the	 loss,	 that	 can	 appear	 in	 the	
structur,	it	is	ought	to	mark	the	suitable	value	of	the	risk:
 – R1:	The	risk	of	the	human	life	loss	in	quoted	standard	[1]	was	qualified	with	the	equal-
ization	 containing	of	 eight	 coefficients.	The	 risk	of	 the	 life	 loss	 can	be	understood	 as	
for	eg.	the	result	of	a	railway	disaster	due	to	the	damage	of	rtc	devices	or	the	loss	of	the	
service	workers	life.	Taking	into	account	concerning	coefficients	of	the	analysed	object	
we	received:
 R1 = RB1	+	RC1	+ RU1	+	RV1	+	RW1	+	RZ1 (1)
 – R2:	The	risk	of	the	public	service	loss:
 R2 = RB2	+	RC2	+RV2	+	RW2	+	RZ2 (2)
 – R4:	The	risk	of	the	material	value	loss:
 R4 = RB4	+	RC4	+RU4	+	RV4	+	RW4	+	RZ4 (3)
Each	components	of	the	risk	marks:
 – R
A
,	R
B
,	R
C
 –	components	of	threats	carried	in	by	the	immediate	lightning	discharge	into	
the	object	(the	source	of	the	threat	S1),
 – R
M
 –	the	component	of	the	threat	carried	in	by	the	lightning	discharge	nearby	the	structure	
(the	source	of	the	threat	S2),
 – R
U
,	R
V
,	R
W	
–	components	of	threats	carried	in	by	the	discharge	into	attached	to	the	struc-
ture	service	–	devices	(the	source	of	the	threat	S3),
 – R
Z
 –	the	component	of	the	threat	carried	in	by	the	immediate	lightning	discharge	nearby	
the	service	–	device	attached	to	the	structure	(the	source	of	the	threat	S2).
In	Fig.1	the	proseding	algorithm	of	the	resources	choice	of	the	lightning	protection	with	
the	 specification	 for:	1)	 the	building	 structure	 and	2)	 for	 the	 service	–	device	 is	 illustrated.	
Components	of	the	risk	for	the	service	–	device	can	be	appointed	from	the	general	equation	as:
 RX = NX ·PX · LX (4)
where:
NX  –		 number	of	dangerous	events	per	annum,
PX  –		 probability	of	damage	to	a	structure,
LX  –		 consequent	loss.
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The	 one	 year’s	 average	 number	N	 of	 threatening	 events	 in	 consequence	 of	 lightning	
discharges,	affecting	the	subjected	to	protection	structure,	is	relative	to	the	stormy	activity	of	
the	region,	where	the	structure	stands	and	to	physical	proprieties	of	the	structure.	To	calculate	
the	number	N,	it	is	ought	to	multiply	the	density	of	strokes	to	the	earth	NG	by	the	equivalent	area	
of	assembling	AD	of	discharges	for	the	given	structure	concedering	the	corrective	components	
concerning	physical	proprieties	of	the	structure.	The	density	of	lightning	discharges	to	the	
earth	NG	is	the	number	of	lightning	discharges	in	1	km
2	for	a	year.	
Fig.	1.	The	algorithm	for	deciding	the	need	of	protection	and	for	selecting	protection	measures	[1]
The	prospective	number	of	threatening	events	ND	for	the	analysed	object	can	be	marked	 
from	the	dependence:	
 ND = NG × AD × CD	×	10
–6  (5)
for	which:
NG		–		 the	one	year’s	average	density	of	lightning	discharges	to	the	earth,
AD	 –		 an	equivalent	area	of	assembling	by	the	structure	(m
2) described	by	the	depen-
dence:
 AD = L × W +	2	×	(3	×	H) × (L +	W)	+	π	×	(3	×	H)
2  (6)
taking	into	account:	the	length	L,	the	width	W	and	the	height	H.
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The	 relative	 position	 of	 the	 structure,	 compensating	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 surrounding	
structures	 or	 the	 endangered	 structure	 position,	 is	 qualified	 by	 the	 component	CD	 which	
accepts	the	values:
0.25		 –		 for	the	surranded	object	with	higher	structures	or	trees,
0.5		 –		 for	the	surranded	object	with	structure	or	trees	about	the	same	height	or	lower,
1		 –		 when	there	is	a	lack	of	other	structures	nearby,
2		 –		 when	the	analysed	structure	is	analysed	isolated	on	a	peak	of	a	hill	or	of	a	knoll.
The	estimation	of	the	one	year’s	average	number	of	threatening	events	in	consequence	of	
discharges	nearby	the	structure N
M
	can	be	marked	from	the	dependence:
 N
M
 = NG × AM	×	10
–6  (7)
If	N
M
	<	0,	then	for	this	estimation	we	should	accept	N
M
	=	0.	
The	risk	R	is	the	sum	of	component	elements	and	its	grand	total	can	be	introduced	in	the	
form	of	the	dependence:	
 R = RD	+	RI	 (8)
where:
RD		 –		 the	risk	of	the	immediate	hit	into	the	structure,
R
I
		 –		 marks	the	risk	of	the	nearby	lightning	stroke.
In	the	used	method,	the	probability	of	the	introduced	assumptions	is	certain,	unless	the	
protection	is	applied.	The	use	of	the	protection	reduces	the	probability	according	to	the	kind	
and	effectivness	of	the	given	risk	storage	element.	With	reducents,	the	risk	can	be:	lightning	
protection	 device,	 limiters	 of	 surges	SPD,	 the	 transformer	 on	 the	 entry	 of	 the	 line	 to	 the	
object,	shielding	of	the	lines	and	wires	or	the	use	of	limitting	resources	of	the	propagation	
of	a	fire.
The	last	component	from	the	relation	(4)	that	is	to	say	the	loss	L
X
	depends	on	the	considered	
of	its	type	(L1,	L2,	L3	and	L4)	and	on	the	type	of	damages	calling	it	out	(D1,	D2	and	D3).	The	
comply	with	the	following	used	symbols	marking	resulting	losses	in	consequence	of:
 – L
T
	–	shocks	at	touch	and	step	voltages;
 – L
F
	–	the	physical	damage;
 – L
0
	–	the	damage	of	internal	systems.	
The	decision	about	necessaries	of	the	use	of	lightning	protection	demands	the	defining	of	
the	risk	value	R	and	comparing	it	with	the	value	of	the	tolerable	risk.	For	example,	the	value	
of	the	tolerated	risk	R
T
	=	10–5	everywhere,	the	damages	can	cause	a	loss	of	a	human	life.	In	
all	other	 cases	 the	qualification	of	 the	value	R
T
	 should	be	performed	by	 suitable	project–
institutions	and	maintenances	of	the	railway	traffic.
4. The assessment of risk components
In	Fig.	2	the	registered	along	the	railway	rout	strokes	with	chosen	windows	for	which	
were	assigned	the	location,	time,	value	of	currents	and	polarizations,	were	placed.
The	system	LINET	for	the	analysed	the	case	[3]	noted	lots	and	lots	of	discharges	in	the	
radius	of	2	km	from	the	railway	line.	The	exactitude	of	the	discharge	location	pronouncement	
given	with	an	error	150–200 m,	is	based	on	the	use	of	the	TOA	(Time–of–Arrival)	technics	
was	optimized	thanks	to	the	utilization	of	GPS	system.	The	average	error	of	the	time	resolution	
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for	the	whole	system	was	qualified	as	equal	0.2	µs.	According	to	data	[3]	on	analysed	section,	
the	surge	of	the	highest	value	157.5	kA	was	registered	in	the	distance	20	m	from	the	axis	of	
tracks	and	40	m	from	the	line	NTL.	This	stroke	caused	the	disconnection	of	rtc	devices	for	
2760	minutes	(46	hours).	For	the	analysed	devices,	which	are:	the	line	NTL,	trolley	wires	
and	the	installed	in	the	track	rtc	devices	(with	automatic	lineal	blockade)	a	simplified	object	
(Fig.	3)	of	the	length	L,	widths	W	and	heights	H, was	accepted.	In	the	case	of	analysis	only	
the	trolley	wires	and	rtc	devices	installed	in	the	track,	an	average	value	of	parameters	was	
accepted	 [5,	 6]:	H1	 =	 6.7	m	which	 is	 the	 average	 of	 the	 trolley	wires	 suspension	 height,	
W1 =	12.5	m	being	the	average	width	of	the	object	consisting	of	the	following	measurements:	
the	width	of	two	tracks	(2	x	1.435	m),	the	average	distance	between	tracks	4	m,	the	distance	
2.5	m	of	the	trolley	wires	columns	from	the	axis	of	tracks	and	the	average	distance	1	m	from	
the	outside	of	 the	 trolley	wires	 columns	 for	 rtc	 devices	 installed	 along	 the	 tracks.	To	 the	
analysis	of	the	object	containing	additionally	NTL	line	installed	in	the	distance	of	20	m	from	
the	track,	the	following	values	of	parameters	were	accepted:	the	average	value	of	the	height	
for	the	line	NTL	H2 =	10.7	m,	the	width	W2 =	29.7	m	assigning	the	distance	between	the	traffic	
passage	where	the	rtc	devices	are	installed	behind	columns	of	the	trolley	wires	on	one	side	
and	a	non–traction	line	on	the	other	side.	In	the	analysis,	two	lengths	of	objects:	L1 =	9	km,	
assigning	 the	chosen	 fragment	of	 the	 track	among	neighbouring	 stations	and	L2 =	45	km,	
being	all	distance	between	extreme	stations	of	 the	analysed	section	 in	which	atmospheric	
discharges	appeared,	were	 took	 into	account.	Extreme	columns	 in	Fig.	3	marked	as	S1	–	
columns	of	the	trolley	wires	and	S2	columns	of	the	line	NTL.	Additionally,	in	table	2	and	3	
calculated	values	of	assembling	equivalent	areas	for	100	kilometres	of	tracks	were	placed,	
marked	as	A
M1
	for	the	trolley	wires	and	A
M2
	for	the	line	NTL.
The	 component	 CD	 compensating	 the	 influence	 of	 surrounding	 structures	 or	 the	
endangered	position	was	accepted	as	equal	0.5	that	is	so,	as	for	the	surrounded	structure	by	
other	structures	or	trees	about	the	same	height	or	lower	and	of	the	surrounded	structure	by	
higher	structure	or	trees	the	value	CD	 is	 lower	by	half	 than	previously	accepted	and	equal	 
CD	=	0.25.
Fig.	2.	The	accepted	to	analysis	fragment	of	the	railway	line	(27_3.jpg)	with	registered	lightning	
flashs	[3]
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Ta b l e 	 2
The evaluating of the risk chosen storage components [1] for discharges into the service – device
AD	[m
2]
Number	of	threatening	events	ND
NG=2/km
2/year	
CD	=	0.5
NG=2/km
2/year
CD	=	0.25
NG	=3/km
2/year	
CD	=	0.5
NG	=3/km
2/year	
CD	=	0.25
AD11 476071 0.48 0.24 0.36 0.18
AD12 850242 0.85 0.43 1.28 0.64
AD21 2313271 2.31 1.16 3.47 1.73
AD22 4230642 4.23 2.12 6.35 3.17
AD1 5271771 5.27 2.64 7.91 3.95
AD2 9395142 9.40 4.70 14.4 7.50
For	the	analysed	area	the	average	of	one	year’s	density	of	lightning	discharges	to–earth	
carries	out	NG	=2.7	km
2	a	year	[7].	For	the	calculations	NG	in	the	range	2÷3	km
2	a	year	was	
accepted.	The	assembling	area	from	the	dependence	(6)	was	marked	as:
1) A D11	 –	 for	 the	 catenary	wire	 (of	 the	 trolley	wires)	 of	 the	 length	L1	 =	 9000	m,	widths 
W1 =	12.5	m	and	heights	H1	=	6.7	m.
 AD12	–	for	the	line	NTL	of	the	length	L1	=	9000	m	running	in	the	distance		W2	=	29.7	m	
from	the	track	on	the	height	H1	=	10.7	m.	
The	appointed	values	of	the	assembling	area	carried	out	properly:	
2) AD21	–	for	the	catenary	wire	(of	the	trolley	wires)	of	the	length	L2	=	45000	m W1	=	12.5	m,	
H2	=	6.7	m	were	accepted.
 AD22	–	for	the	line	NTL	of	the	length	L 2	=	45000	m,	running	in	the	distance	
 W2 =	29.7	m	from	the	track	on	the	height	H1	=	10.7	m.	
Fig.	3.	The	accepted	to	analysis	the	general	scheme	of	the	structure	
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To	 estimate	 the	 one	 year’s	 average	 number	 of	 threatening	 events	 in	 consequence	 of	
discharges	nearby	the	structure	N
M
	from	the	dependence	(7),	the	registered	nearby	discharges	
were	found	at	the	farthest	500	m	from	the	track	were	taken	into	account.	
Below,	 were	 marked	 the	 assembling	 areas	 of	 threatening	 events	 in	 consequence	 of	
discharges	nearby	the	structure A
M11
÷A
M22
	and	A
M1
	and	A
M22
	for	different	(accepted	similarly,	
as	above)	lengths	L,	widths	W,	NG=	2÷3	/	km
2	a	year	and	of	the	accepted	point	in	the	distance	
500	m	[1]	using	Formula	9	(A.7	from	the	standard	[1]):	
 A
M
	=	2	×	500	×	(L +	W)	+	π	×	5002		 (9)
Values	of	losses	L′
F
	and	L′
O
	can	be	fixed	in	categories	of	a	relative	size	of	possible	losses	
on	the	base	of	the	following	approximate	dependence	(E1	from	the	standard	[1]):
 L′x	=	n
p
	/	n
t	
× t /	8	760	 	(10)
where:
n
p		
–		 the	average	number	of	not	served	users;
n
t		
–  the	entire	number	of	persons	(served	users);
t  –  ithe	one	year’s	period	of	the	service	loss	(in	hours).
For	one	case	of	rtc	devices	damages	of	the	values	n
p
	and	n
t
	were	skipped	because	of	the	
lack	of	data.	The	value	t	=	46	hours	from	here	the	loss	carries	out	L	=	5·10–3.	For	example	
according	 to	 the	Table	E.1	 of	 the	 standard	 [1],	 for	 the	 electric	 power	 supply,	 the	 typical	
average	values	of	losses	carry	out	L′
F
 = 10–2	and	L′
0
 = 10–3. 
Ta b l e 	 3
The	evaluation	of	the	risk	chosen	storage	components	[1]	for	discharges	nearby	the	service	–	device
A
M
	[m2]
The	number	of	threatening	events	N
M
		nearby	the	service	–	device
NG =	2/km
2/year NG	=	3/km
2	/year
A
M11
9797500 19.60 29.40
A
M12
9814700 19.63 29.44
A
M21
45797500 91.60 137.40
A
M22
45814700 91.63 137.44
A
M1
100797500 201.60 302.40
A
M2
100814700 201.63 302.44
The	 probability	P′
V
	 that	 the	 discharge	 into	 the	 line	 will	 cause	 physical	 damages	 and	
the	probability	P′
W
	 that	 the	discharge	 into	 the	 line	will	cause	 the	damage	of	 the	service	–	
equipment	is	related	to	the	damage	current	Ia	which	is	relative	to	proprieties	of	the	line	and	
of	the	used	protection	resources.	For	the	non–shielded	line,	we	ought	to	accept	Ia	=	0.	For	
example	for	shielded	 lines,	we	ought	 to	mark	 the	damage	current	 Ia	 from	the	dependence	
(D.7) (standards	[1]):
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 Ia = 25 Uw	/	(Rs × Kd × Kp) (11)
where:
K
d
		–		 the	coefficient	depending	on	the	propriety	of	the	line	(Table	D.1	[1]);
K
p
		–		 the	 coefficient	 taking	 into	 account	 practical	 protection	 resources	 (Table	D.2	
[1]);
U
w	
	–		 the	surge	voltage	held	out	[kV]	(Table	D.3	for	cables	and	Table	D.4	for	devices	
of	the	standard	[1]);
R
s
		 –		 the	resistance	of	the	cable	screen	[Ω/km].
In	 the	 case	 of	 telecommunication	 lines,	 to	 the	 evaluation	 of	 P′
V
	 we	 accept	 that	 the	
maximum	damage	current	Ia,	has	the	values:
Ia	=	40	kA	for	cables	with	a	lead	screen,
Ia	=	20	kA	for	cables	with	an	aluminium	–	screen.
For	 a	 known	 value	 of	 the	 surge	 current	 for	 eg.	 150	 kA	 given	 in	 the	Table	D5	 of	 the	
standard	[1],	values	of	the	probability	P′
V
	and	P′
W
	carry	out	0.02.	
The	values	of	the	probability	P
Z
,	marking	that	the	lightning	discharge	occurrents	nearby	
the	service	–	device	will	cause	a	damage	of	internal	systems,	depends	on	the	proprieties	of	
the	service	–	device	screen,	surge	voltage	held	out	connected	to	the	service	–	device	internal	
system	 and	 of	 practical	 protection	 resources.	 If	 the	 coordinated	 system	SPD	 is	 not	 used,	
suiting	the	EN	62305–4	[8],	the	value	P
Z
	is	equal	to	value	P
LI
	which	marks	the	probability	
of	the	internal	systems	damages	in	consequence	of	the	discharge	into	the	connected	service	
–	 device.	 Proposed	 protection	 resources	 should	 be	 well–chosen	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	
standards	EN	62305–3	[9]	and	EN	62305–4	[8].
5. Calculation of induced overvoltages using LIOV software 
In	 accordance	 with	 the	 standard	 [10]	 with	 accessible	 data	 from	 the	 lightning	 current	
research,	 we	 can	 distinguish	 three	 kinds	 of	 discharges:	 the	 positive	 discharge,	 the	 first	
component	of	the	negative	discharge	and	the	following	component	[11].	Maximum	values	of	
positive	discharges	currents	can	reach	200	kA.	Positive	discharges	are	rare	occurrences	being	
characterized	that	the	discharge	has	its	own	beginning	in	the	upper	part	of	the	thundercloud.	
This	kind	of	discharging	is	characterized	with	a	large	energy	mattering	in	the	analysis	and	
modelling	[12].
The	 LIOV	 software	 (Lightning–Induced	 Over	 Voltage)	 [13]	 makes	 possible	 the	
marking	of	voltages	for	the	overhead	transmission	line	situated	in	a	definite	distance	from	
the	 channel	 of	 the	 lightning	 descharges.	 In	 the	modelling	 of	 the	 static	 electromagnetic	
field	 connection	with	 the	 transmission	 line	we	mark	 the	 component	 of	 the	 electric	 and	
magnetical	 field	 nearby	 the	 line.	 The	 LIOV	 software	 consists	 of	 subroutines:	 MTLF	
(Modified–Transmission	Line	Fields)	and	MTLV	(Modified–Transmission	Line	Voltages).	
The	subroutine	MTLF.exe	serves	marking	 the	 resultant	magnetic	field	as	a	 result	of	 the	
current	flow	in	the	channel	of	the	discharge	taking	into	account	the	current	speed	in	the	
channel	of	the	static.	The	subroutine	MTLV.exe	has	for	an	assignment	marking	the	voltages	
induced	along	the	line.
In	the	LIOV	software	it	was	assumed	that	the	current	at	the	static	channel	base	is	described	
by	the	dependence	proposed	by	Heidler	[14]	and	used	also	in	the	standard	[10]:
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where:	
Imk –		 the	maximum	value	of	the	current,	
τ1k –		 the	time	base	of	the	first	element	of	the	function,	
τ2k		 –		 the	time	base	of	the	second	element	of	the	function.
The	factor	is	marked	from	the	formula:
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In	the	software	it	was	accepted	that	the	current	at	the	static	channel	base	has	the	form:	
 i t i t i t i tH H DE( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )0 0 0 01 2= + +  (14)
and	is	the	sum	of	two	Heidler	functions	iH1(0,	t)	and		iH2(0,	t)	described	by	the	dependence	
(12)	and	parameters	placed	in	the	Table	4	as	well	as	of	the	third	–	two–exponential	function	
described	by	the	dependence	(15).
T a b l e 	 4
Parameters of the function described by the formula (12) [13]
The	lightning	current	–	the	following	component	of	the	negative	discharge
k Imk,	kA τ1k,	μs τ2k,	μs ηk ηk
1 10.7 0.25 2.5 2 0.639
2 6.5 2.1 230 2 0.874
 i t I e eDE m
t t( , ) (( ) ( ) )0 1 1= − − −− −α β  (15)
For	example,	the	given	in	standard	[10]	for	the	first	level	of	the	amplitude	and	shapes	of	
the	current	courses	protection,	carry	out	for:
 – the	long	stroke component:	400 A;	0.5 s,
 – the	first	stroke	component:	200 kA;	10/350 μs,
 – following	stroke	components:	50 kA;	0.25/100 μs.
In	standard	[10]	the	temporary	form	of	the	impulse	current	for	the	first	(10/350	ms)	and	the	
following	(0.25/100	ms)	stroke	components	is	described	by	the	equalization	(of	parameters	
given	in	Table	5):
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where:	
I  –  is	the	peak	current,
k  –		correction	factor	for	the	peak	current,
k		 –		the	corrective	coefficient	of	the	maximum	value,	
t  –  time, 
τ1		–		is	the	front	time	constant,
τ2		–		is	the	tail	time	constant.
Ta b l e 	 5
Parameters of impulse current for different levels of the lightning protection [10]
Parameters
First	positive	impulse Subsequent	negative	impulse	
Level	of	the	lightning	protection	 Level	of	the	lightning	protection
I II III–IV I II III–IV
I	(kA) 200 150 100 50 7.5 25
K 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.933 0.933 0.933
τ1	(µs) 19 19 19 0.454 0.454 0.454
τ2	(µs) 485 485 485 143 143 143
Fig.	4.	The	system	of	the	discharge	channel	–	transmission	line	[13]
In	the	modelling	for	the	estimated	value	of	the	stroke	[3],	the	stroke	source	model	was	
modified	limiting	it	to	the	maximum	value	of	the	first	discharge.	In	standard	[10]	parameters	
for	 the	 stroke	 of	 the	maximum	value	 150	kV	are	 given	 and	 such	data	were	 accepted	 for	
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calculations.	The	input	datas	in	LIOVF	software	contain	the	entrance	signal	of	the	lightning	
current,	 brought	 into	 the	 given	 distance	 (Fig.	 4)	 from	 the	 overhead	 transmission	 line	 of	
electric	and	geometrical	given	parameters	[15].	Additionally	the	programme	contains	such	
data,	 as:	 the	 observation	 time,	 number	 of	 accepted	 samples	 for	 the	 analysis.	The	 data	 is	
inscribed	 into	 the	 following	 programme	 windows.	 For	 calculations	 of	 the	 lines	 NTL	
of	 symmetrical	 triangular	 lines	 system	 the	diameter	d	=	0.7	cm,	and	 for	 the	 trolley	wires	 
d	=	0.6	cm	was	accepted	[5,	6].	The	remaining	parameters	were	qualified,	as	in	the	accepted	
model	(Fig.	3).	As	a	load	of	the	line,	impedances	of	equal	values	to	the	wave–	impedance	of	
the	lines	(of	a	catenary	wire	for	the	trolley	wires	and	the	line	NTL)	were	given.	The	accepted	
for	calculations	section	of	the	line	had	the	length	1000	m	(Fig.	4).	The	channel	of	the	stroke	
was	placed	(in	the	half–way	of	the	line)	on	the	perpendicular	of	the	line	symmetry	axis	in	
distances	y	such,	as	for	the	analysed	situation	ie,	for	the	stroke	of	a	value	about	157	kA	(for	
the	line	NTL	–	40	m,	and	for	the	trolley	wires	–	20	m).	
Fig.	5.	Courses	of	surges	for:	a)	trolley	wires	situated	in	the	distance	–	20	m	from	the	channel	 
of	the	stroke,	b)	the	line	NTL	(for	the	distance	–	40	m);	the	dashed	lines	–	surges	on	both	ends	of	the	
line,	the	solid	lines	–	the	nearest	voltage	to	the	stroke	
For	both	distances	20	m	and	40	m	(Fig.	5)	the	surges	reached	values	considerably	above	
300	kV.	From	the	analysis	of	the	temporary	documentation	concerning	damages	it	results	that	
this	stroke	was	destructive	for	damaged	rtc	devices.	The	estimated	values	of	surges	confirm	
this	assumption.
6. Conclusions
In	consideration	of	that	trolley	wireses	and	NTL	lines	are	not	protected	lightning	wires.	
Occurrent	surges	at	the	immediate	direct	lightning	strikes	can	be	an	order	of	megavolts.	This	
is	a	very	large	threat	for	rtc	devices	and	the	traction.	The	induced	overvoltages	are	also	a	large	
threat	in	the	case	of	a	lightning	stroke	nearby	the	traction	and	the	non–traction	line.	Their	
values	are	lower,	but	the	area	of	their	influence	and	the	number	of	lightning	discharges	in	
a	year	are	considerably	greater.	The	appointed	as	an	example	courses	can	be	a	tool	helping	in	
the	protection	design	of	the	lightning	protection	or	the	isolation	coordination.	
a)																																																																																b)
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